On this occasion of honouring the achievement of Philip McShane, I would like to recall his earliest and, in my judgment, most important work, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence. In particular, I will recall how that work situated Lonergan’s important breakthrough on statistical method in relation to the major currents of thought on the subject, many of which remain influential still today.

In his most recent book Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes the dominant moral system of advanced societies, which “presents itself as morality as such.” Yet, he argues, its primary function is to channel human desires into patterns that will minimize conflict amid distinctively modern economic and political arrangements. Although he appreciates how what he calls “expressionism” has unmasked this ideological function of modern morality, he points out that expressionism is also impotent to provide adequate moral guidance amidst the “conflicts of modernity.” He (...) proposes that Neo-Aristotelianism’s account of reasoning and desire has the ability to overcome the moral failings of these modern modes of thought. Yet he relies on an excessively deductive version of reason and overlooks Aristotle’s fuller account of desire. The article shows how Bernard Lonergan’s account of both provides a superior account of both Aristotle’s own writings and the actual human phenomena of reasoning and desire. (shrink)

One of the lesser known features of Bernard Lonergan’s Insight is his theory of the relationship between being and goodness. Central to that theory is his claimthat the totality of being is good. From this central claim, Lonergan worked out an “ontology of the good,” in which the structures of ontological interdependencyare reflected in a theory of the scale of higher and lower values. Unfortunately, Lonergan’s way of supporting his claim in Insight is problematic. This article firstsummarizes Lonergan’s theory of (...) the goodness of being, then identifies problems with his exposition, and finally shows how Lonergan could have arrived at thesame positions by closer adherence to his own philosophical methods. The article concludes by showing some of the advantages of Lonergan’s account of the goodness of being for contemporary debates in ethics. (shrink)

Hutton considers the ideas of philosophers, poets, and historians to seek outthe roots of fact as mere recollection.

It is well known that Albert Einstein adhered to a deterministic world view throughout his career. Nevertheless, his developments of the special and general theories of relativity prove to be incompatible with that world view. Two different forms of determinism—classical Laplacian determinism and the determinism of isolated systems—are considered. Through careful considerations of what concretely is involved in predicting future states of the entire universe, or of isolated systems, it is shown that the demands of the theories of relativity make (...) these deterministic positions untenable. (shrink)

This article shows how Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of science can bring resolution to a recent controversy: the controversy that arises from Intelligent Design theorists' and proponents of neo-Darwinian evolution. Intelligent Design theories argue that the complex structures of living organisms cannot be adequately explained by neo-Darwinian theories, especially by its postulate of random variations. Hence, an "intelligent designer" must be postulated in order to fill out scientific explanations. This article finds fault with the Intelligent Design arguments, but proposes a different (...) form of design argument–one that accepts neo-Darwinian evolution (or something very much like it). It shows how Lonergan's analysis of scientific methods grounds his account of evolution, and how much this can overcome the most basic Intelligent Design objections. It then shows how Lonergan's philosophy of God also can offer a design argument based, not in the complexity of this or that organism, but in the "design" of evolution itself. /// O presente artigo mostra até que ponto a filosofia da ciência de Bernard Lonergan pode trazer resolução à recente controvérsia suscitada pelos defensores da Teoria do Desígnio Inteligente, teoria essa fortemente atacada pelos defensores neo-darwinistas da teoria da evolução. As teorias do Desígnio Inteligente defendem que as estruturas complexas dos organismos vivos não podem ser adequadamente explicadas pelas teorias neo-darwinistas, especialmente pelo seu postulado relativo às variações de acaso. Nesse sentido, um agente Inteligente teria de ser postulado em ordem a prover as necessárias explicações científicas. O autor do presente artigo, porém, considera que a argumentação dos defensores do Desígnio Inteligente é defeituosa, pelo queavança um novo argumento de desígnio, um efectivamente que aceita a teoria da evolução neo-darwiniana (ou algo muito semelhante a ela). Em suma, o artigo mostra até que ponto a análise lonerganiana dos métodos científicos subjaz à sua própria teoria da evolução, mostrando-se assim também de que forma esta doutrina ultrapassa as objecções mais elementares dos defensores da Teoria do Desígnio Inteligente. Por fim, mostra-se ainda de que modo a filosofia de Lonergan sobre Deus pode oferecer um argumento de desígnio baseado, não na complexidade deste ou daquele organismo, mas no "desígnio" da evolução em si mesma. (shrink)

Lonergan’s written reflections on the notion of form span almost thirty years. Beginning with his 1930s manuscripts on the philosophy of history, Lonergan returned again and again to the problem of clarifying that metaphysical concept. His thought on the issue of form reached its mature stage in 1957 with the publication of Insight. This article first presents an account of the mature, Insight stage of Lonergan’s notion of form. It then shows how Lonergan arrived at that position from his interpretation (...) of Aristotle as set forth in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. It concludes with some remarks in response to a criticism of Lonergan, commonly leveled by certain Thomist thinkers, according to which Lonergan’s effort to ground philosophy in self-appropriation rather than metaphysics condemns him to a subjectivist or idealist position. Such a critique, I argue, fails to take into account what Lonergan actually held. Indeed, the preference for a metaphysical point de départ is itself vulnerable to a reverse criticism on Lonergan’s part. (shrink)

Albert Einstein's attitude towards quantum mechanics—and statistical physics in general—was a puzzle to many of his contemporaries, and has remained a puzzle to the present. Though he made many significant contributions to statistical physics, he continually refused to regard that branch of science as fundamental. The present essay demonstrates that his attitude towards statistical physics was formed during his earliest investigations—between 1901 and 1903. In particular, it is shown that in Einstein's view, statistical laws are based upon non-statistical assumptions. This (...) view influenced much of his later thinking. A few illustrations are offered, concluding with a discussion of his opposition to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

I argue that Moorean theories of value have a difficult time accommodating the resonance requirement, that is, the platitude that we should value what’s valuable, while a sophisticated reflective endorsement theory of value and the resonance requirement are perfectly consistent. To this extent, a sophisticated reflective endorsement theory has a significant advantage over the Moorean approach. The reflective endorsement theory that I endorse emphasizes systematic exposure to possible sources of satisfaction, as well as a similarity principle of practical rationality.

SummaryEinstein frequently used the historical narrative form to express his philosophical and even scientific ideas. Analysis of his historical writings reveals that he employed a distinctive historical method which may be designated an “intuitive archeology”, following one of his examples. It will be shown that his historical method was consistently directed toward the goal of freeing ongoing scientific research from arbitrary restrictions. He regarded these arbitrary restrictions, in turn, to be the result of a loss of recollection of the origins (...) of scientific concepts. Finally, Einstein's position that the reality of the historical process of science itself validated his approach to writing history will be discussed.RésuméEinstein a souvent utilisé la forme d'une narration historique pour exprimer ses idés philosophiques ou même scientifiques. L'analyse de ses écrits historiques révèle qu'il employait une méthode historique particulière qui peut être appelée »archeologie intuitive« selon I'un de ses exemples. L'auteur montre que sa méthode historique avait constéuemment pour but de libérer la recherche actuelle de restrictions arbitraires. II considérait ces restrictions arbitraires elles‐mêmes comme résultant d'un oubli des origines des concepts scientifiques. Enfin, I'auteur discute la position d'Einstein selon laquelle la réalité historique que constitue la science elle‐même justifiait sa manière d'écrire I'histoire.ZusammenfassungEinstein verwendet häufig die historisch erzählende Form, um seine philosophischen und ge‐legentlich sogar urn seine wissenschaftlichen Gedanken zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Eine Untersu‐chung seiner historischen Schriften verrät, dass er eine besondere historische Methode angewen‐det hat, die einem seiner eigenen Beispiele gemass als »intuitive Archaologie« bezeichnet werden kann. Es wird gezeigt, dass seine historische Methode immer darauf ausgerichtet ist, die fortschreitende Forschung von willkürlichen Einschräkungen zu befreien. Solche willkürlichen Beschränkungen betrachtete er als das Ergebnis einer Miss‐achtung des Ursprungs der wissenschaftlichen Begriffe. Es wird schliesslich Einsteins Anspruch diskutiert, wonach der wirkliche Entwicklungsprozess der Wissenschaft seine Art, Geschichte zu schreiben, rechtfertigt. (shrink)

Two recent studies by Joseph Torchia and Paul Griffiths show the importance of Augustine’s critique of the vice of curiositas to contemporary life and thought. Superficially, it might seem that Augustine condemned curiosity because it “seeks to find out whatever it wishes without restriction of any kind.” Though profoundly influenced by Augustine, Bernard Lonergan praised intellectual curiosity precisely insofar as it is motivated by an unrestricted desire to know, rather than by less noble motives. Drawing upon the researches of Torchia (...) and Griffiths, this article endeavors to show that Augustine does not simply equate curiositas with an unrestricted desire to know, and that the virtue of intellectual curiosity as Lonergan understood it is in fact endorsed by Augustine by means of its relationship to the virtue of studiositas. This more nuanced view of the virtues and vices of intellect can provide guidance for contemporary intellectual pursuits, both how to pursue and not to pursue knowledge. (shrink)

The works of three well-remembered French historians- Jules Michelet, Alphonse Aulard, and François Furet - raise the issue of memory's relationship to history, but each treats it in a different way. History for Michelet concerned the sustaining of tradition. His conceptions of the past grew directly out of a living tradition, from which he established comparatively little distance. For Aulard, history meant consecrating its events in the guise of science. History for Furet demanded the deconstruction of the commemorative forms in (...) which the history of the Revolution had been enshrined. Today's historians may not wish to commemorate the past, but a historiography that dismisses the significance of a tradition of understanding the passions of the past is likely to lose its appeal to posterity. The writings emanating from this tradition hold great power to reveal the meaning the Revolution held for its participants. Overlooking the potency of these writings in order to underscore their power to shape the form of the Revolution's commemoration would be to deprive the event itself of enduring appeal. (shrink)